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Chapter 3
The Sufficiency of Retirement Savings:
Comparing Cohorts at the Time
of Retirement
Robert Haveman, Karen Holden, Barbara L. Wolfe,
and Andrei Romanov
Social Security benefits provide nearly all US retirees with a base level
of support, but for many, postretirement consumption above that base
level requires privately accumulated financial wealth, housing equity, and
pensions.1 Policymakers are concerned that resources available at the time
of retirement may be insufficient to maintain economic well-being during
the remaining years of life, and researchers arrive at rather different con-
clusions regarding the adequacy of available retirement resources.2 This
chapter explores saving sufficiency using data on two cohorts of individuals
at the time they retired, one in the early 1980s and a second in the mid-
1990s. We use data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and
also the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) to evaluate the adequacy of saving
across these two cohorts. Our comparison of resource sufficiency across
these two cohorts enables us to assess time-series changes in the overall
level of retirement resources, and also to appraise the impact on saving
adequacy of changes in financial wealth and especially the concentration
of wealth increments among the wealthy (Wolff 2004).
After a brief survey of prior studies, we go on to discuss our methodology
and summarize results. We conclude that mean levels of both new retiree
wealth and annuitized net wealth (ANW) increased substantially from the
earlier to later cohort, yet social adequacy targets are less well met over
time. Our results further indicate that the failure to meet the poverty and
near-poverty thresholds is increasingly concentrated among singles and
among those with the lowest human capital and low labor force attachment;
vulnerability to inadequate resources in working life appears to persist into
retirement.
Previous Literature
A growing literature analyzes the ‘adequacy of savings’ of people at or near
to retirement, using a variety of approaches. These studies generally fall
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into two categories: those that assess savings behavior of individuals prior
to retirement and, hence, the likely adequacy of resources at retirement,
and those that assess how well individuals fare during retirement, given the
retirement resources they have accumulated. Both types of studies require
a standard against which to judge resource adequacy, as well as an estimate
of the number of years (and family members) over which these resources
must be allocated.
The first set of studies asks whether individuals approaching
retirement—but not yet retired—are saving ‘enough’ to attain some stan-
dard of adequacy as of an assumed retirement age. The availability of
longitudinal data with rich financial data, including the Health and Retire-
ment Survey (HRS), has enabled the study of individuals’ preretirement
savings and asset accumulation patterns as they approach retirement. These
studies of prospective savings adequacy at retirement reach quite disparate
conclusions. Some conclude that modest pockets of inadequacy mar a
generally optimistic overall situation, while others find a serious shortfall in
savings. The disparate results of prospective saving adequacy studies arise
from different methods of estimating future savings and assumptions about
adequacy, life expectancy, and retirement age. In what follows we focus on a
subset of past studies; a wide range of prior research and their conclusions
appear in Table 3-1.
Some models, including Bernheim (1997), construct a simulation model
to calculate ‘optimal’ savings behavior over the life cycle for families of
different sizes, educational levels, ages (and hence, life expectancies),
earnings, Social Security, and pension benefits. Bernheim’s ‘Baby Boomer
Retirement Index’ is the ratio of the actual level of older persons’ accu-
mulated financial and housing savings and the simulated target level of
savings minus Social Security and pension savings. Low levels of this index
support his conclusion that the financial and housing wealth of ‘Baby
Boomers’ is only about one-third of the target level of savings. Mitchell et al.
(2000) and Moore and Mitchell (2000) also take this tack, simulating saving
required by the initial HRS sample that would be necessary to maintain
living conditions after assumed retirement. Assuming continued earnings
up to the early (62) or normal (65) retirement age, and historical returns
on financial wealth, they find a median required savings rate of 16 percent
if retirement is at age 62, dropping to only 7 percent if retirement were
delayed to age 65. There is substantial heterogeneity in required saving
rates, with required saving rising with earnings. Compared to actual saving
patterns, these figures imply substantial under saving as people approach
retirement, especially if retirement were slated for the modal retirement
age of 62. A similar analysis by Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) also uses
the HRS, and calculates the annuitized value of household wealth for
respondents age 51–61, projecting to their expected retirement ages. As
in Moore and Mitchell, this annuitized value is computed as the sum of
T
ab
le
3-
1
L
it
er
at
ur
e
R
ev
ie
w
on
R
et
ir
em
en
t A
de
qu
ac
y:
M
et
h
od
s,
D
at
a,
an
d
C
on
cl
us
io
n
s
St
ud
y
D
at
a
M
ea
su
re
of
ad
eq
ua
cy
Es
tim
at
io
n
ap
pr
oa
ch
C
on
cl
us
io
ns
B
er
n
h
ei
m
(1
99
2–
97
)
A
n
n
ua
ls
ur
ve
ys
of
20
00
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
Fi
n
an
ci
al
sa
vi
n
g
re
la
ti
ve
to
si
m
ul
at
ed
ta
rg
et
sa
vi
n
g
n
ee
de
d
to
m
ai
n
ta
in
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
tl
iv
in
g
st
an
da
rd
s.
Si
m
ul
at
io
n
m
od
el
ca
lc
ul
at
in
g
‘o
pt
im
al
’s
av
in
gs
ov
er
th
e
lif
e
cy
cl
e
fo
r
h
et
er
og
en
eo
us
fa
m
ili
es
.
A
bo
ut
on
e-
th
ir
d
of
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
ar
e
pr
oj
ec
te
d
to
h
av
e
su
ffi
ci
en
tfi
n
an
ci
al
sa
vi
n
gs
to
m
ee
to
bj
ec
ti
ve
.
M
oo
re
an
d
M
it
ch
el
l
(2
00
0)
;M
it
ch
el
l
et
al
.(
20
00
)
H
R
S
(1
99
2)
A
bi
lit
y
to
m
ai
n
ta
in
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
t
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
,a
ss
um
in
g
re
ti
re
m
en
ta
ta
ge
s
62
an
d
65
.
E
st
im
at
io
n
of
re
qu
ir
ed
sa
vi
n
gs
ra
te
s
ov
er
re
m
ai
n
in
g
w
or
k
ye
ar
s
to
m
ai
n
ta
in
cu
rr
en
t
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
.
30
–4
0
pe
rc
en
to
fh
ou
se
h
ol
ds
h
av
e
su
ffi
ci
en
ts
av
in
gs
;
m
ed
ia
n
w
ea
lt
h
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
n
ee
ds
to
sa
ve
9–
18
pe
rc
en
t
of
in
co
m
e
in
re
m
ai
n
in
g
w
or
k
ye
ar
s;
be
tw
ee
n
on
e
qu
ar
te
r
an
d
on
e-
th
ir
d
of
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
h
av
e
ac
tu
al
sa
vi
n
gs
ra
te
s
eq
ua
lt
o
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
ra
te
s.
G
us
tm
an
an
d
St
ei
n
m
ei
er
(1
99
8)
H
R
S
(1
99
2)
A
n
n
ui
ti
ze
d
w
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
ve
to
cu
rr
en
te
ar
n
in
gs
at
ex
pe
ct
ed
re
ti
re
m
en
ta
ge
.
E
st
im
at
io
n
of
ab
ili
ty
to
pu
rc
h
as
e
a
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
jo
in
t-a
n
d-
su
rv
iv
or
s
be
n
efi
t
an
n
ui
ty
at
as
su
m
ed
re
ti
re
m
en
ta
ge
ba
se
d
on
as
su
m
ed
w
or
k/
ea
rn
in
gs
/
sa
vi
n
gs
be
h
av
io
r.
R
ea
lr
ep
la
ce
m
en
tr
at
e
of
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
at
m
ed
ia
n
of
lif
et
im
e
ea
rn
in
gs
di
st
ri
bu
ti
on
is
ab
ou
t
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
.L
ow
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d
w
ea
lt
h
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
h
av
e
lo
w
er
ra
te
s.
E
n
ge
n
et
al
.(
19
99
)
H
R
S
(1
99
2)
;
SC
F
(1
98
3–
98
)
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of
ac
tu
al
w
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
ve
to
si
m
ul
at
ed
ut
ili
ty
m
ax
im
iz
in
g
ta
rg
et
w
ea
lt
h
,
as
su
m
in
g
op
ti
m
iz
in
g
be
h
av
io
r
in
th
e
fa
ce
of
un
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
.
St
oc
h
as
ti
c
lif
e-
cy
cl
e
m
od
el
of
ut
ili
ty
m
ax
im
iz
in
g
fa
m
ili
es
op
ti
m
iz
in
g
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
,t
o
es
ti
m
at
e
at
ta
in
m
en
to
f
ta
rg
et
w
ea
lt
h
at
re
ti
re
m
en
t.
O
ve
r
60
pe
rc
en
to
ff
am
ili
es
m
ee
tt
h
e
ta
rg
et
re
pl
ac
em
en
tr
at
e;
w
it
h
su
bs
ta
n
ti
al
ly
lo
w
er
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
s
am
on
g
lo
w
er
in
co
m
e
an
d
w
ea
lt
h
fa
m
ili
es
.
Sc
h
ol
z
et
al
.(
20
04
)
H
R
S
(1
99
2)
A
ct
ua
lw
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
ve
to
si
m
ul
at
ed
ut
ili
ty
m
ax
im
iz
in
g
ta
rg
et
w
ea
lt
h
,a
ss
um
in
g
op
ti
m
iz
in
g
be
h
av
io
r
in
th
e
fa
ce
of
un
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
.
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
of
ac
tu
al
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
w
it
h
si
m
ul
at
ed
m
ax
im
iz
in
g
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
to
es
ti
m
at
e
ex
te
n
tt
o
w
h
ic
h
w
ea
lt
h
is
su
ffi
ci
en
tt
o
m
ai
n
ta
in
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
t
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
.
M
or
e
th
an
80
pe
rc
en
to
f
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
h
av
e
su
ffi
ci
en
t
ex
pe
ct
ed
w
ea
lt
h
at
re
ti
re
m
en
t.
W
ol
ff
(2
00
2)
SC
F
(1
98
3–
98
)
A
pr
oj
ec
ti
on
of
an
n
ui
ti
ze
d
w
ea
lt
h
at
re
ti
re
m
en
t(
ag
e
65
)
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
po
ve
rt
y
lin
e
an
d
to
in
co
m
e
in
th
e
su
rv
ey
ye
ar
.
E
st
im
at
io
n
of
in
co
m
e-
re
pl
ac
em
en
tr
at
es
an
d
ra
ti
os
of
an
n
ui
ti
ze
d
w
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
ve
to
th
e
po
ve
rt
y
lin
e,
fr
om
19
83
–9
8,
fo
r
ag
e
gr
ou
p
47
–6
4
ye
ar
s.
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
w
it
h
ex
pe
ct
ed
re
ti
re
m
en
ti
n
co
m
e
be
lo
w
a
h
al
fo
fc
ur
re
nt
in
co
m
e
in
cr
ea
se
d
fr
om
30
pe
rc
en
t
to
43
pe
rc
en
to
ve
r
th
e
pe
ri
od
—
an
in
cr
ea
si
n
gl
y
se
ri
ou
s
sh
or
tf
al
li
n
re
ti
re
m
en
ti
n
co
m
e.
B
ut
ri
ca
et
al
.(
20
03
)
SI
PP
;S
oc
ia
l
Se
cu
ri
ty
A
dm
in
is
tr
a-
ti
on
E
ar
n
in
gs
an
d
B
en
efi
t
R
ec
or
ds
A
pr
oj
ec
ti
on
of
in
co
m
e
at
ag
e
67
re
la
ti
ve
to
av
er
ag
e
sh
ar
ed
in
co
m
e
ov
er
ag
es
22
to
62
an
d
to
p o
ve
rt
y
lin
e.
U
se
s
So
ci
al
Se
cu
ri
ty
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n
M
IN
T
da
ta
sy
st
em
to
pr
oj
ec
ti
n
co
m
e
an
d
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
‘B
ab
y
B
oo
m
’g
en
er
at
io
n
in
to
re
ti
re
m
en
ty
ea
rs
,a
n
d
co
m
pa
re
s
th
is
in
co
m
e
to
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
tl
iv
in
g
st
an
da
rd
s.
M
ed
ia
n
re
pl
ac
em
en
tr
at
es
ar
e
pr
oj
ec
te
d
to
be
93
pe
rc
en
t
fo
r
cu
rr
en
tr
et
ir
ee
s,
de
cr
ea
si
n
g
to
ab
ou
t
80
pe
rc
en
tf
or
fu
tu
re
co
h
or
ts
of
re
ti
re
es
;p
ov
er
ty
ra
te
s
de
cl
in
e
fr
om
ab
ou
t
8
pe
rc
en
tf
or
cu
rr
en
t
re
ti
re
es
to
4
pe
rc
en
tf
or
‘B
ab
y
B
oo
m
er
s’
.
(c
on
t.)
T
ab
le
3-
1
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
St
ud
y
D
at
a
M
ea
su
re
of
ad
eq
ua
cy
Es
tim
at
io
n
ap
pr
oa
ch
C
on
cl
us
io
ns
H
av
em
an
et
al
.(
20
06
)
N
B
S
A
n
n
ui
ti
ze
d
w
ea
lt
h
re
la
ti
ve
to
pe
rm
an
en
tp
re
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
an
d
po
ve
rt
y
lin
e,
fo
r
n
ew
So
ci
al
Se
cu
ri
ty
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s
in
19
80
–8
1.
U
se
s
su
rv
ey
da
ta
an
d
lin
ke
d
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
re
co
rd
s
to
ca
lc
ul
at
e
an
n
ui
ti
ze
d
w
ea
lt
h
of
n
ew
be
n
efi
ci
ar
ie
s,
pe
rm
an
en
tp
re
re
ti
re
m
en
t
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
.
A
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y
30
pe
rc
en
to
f
n
ew
re
ti
re
es
h
av
e
in
su
ffi
ci
en
tr
es
ou
rc
es
to
re
pl
ac
e
70
pe
rc
en
to
f
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
t
co
n
su
m
pt
io
n
.F
ew
er
th
an
2
pe
rc
en
to
fc
ou
pl
es
an
d
ab
ou
t1
0
pe
rc
en
to
fs
in
gl
es
ar
e
in
po
ve
rt
y;
th
is
pr
ob
le
m
is
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
ed
am
on
g
th
e
lo
w
es
te
ar
n
er
s.
M
un
n
el
la
n
d
So
to
(2
00
6a
,2
00
6b
,
20
06
c)
H
R
S
(W
av
es
1–
6)
So
ci
al
Se
cu
ri
ty
be
n
efi
ts
(a
n
d
be
n
efi
ts
pl
us
em
pl
oy
er
pe
n
si
on
s/
40
1k
,a
n
d
th
is
de
fi
n
it
io
n
pl
us
an
n
ui
ti
ze
d
fi
n
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
)
re
la
ti
ve
to
av
er
ag
e
in
de
xe
d
m
on
th
ly
in
co
m
e
(A
IM
E
)
(p
lu
s
A
IM
E
pl
us
re
tu
rn
s
on
fi
n
an
ci
al
as
se
ts
an
d
to
to
p
fi
ve
ye
ar
s
of
re
ce
n
tt
en
of
in
fl
at
io
n
-a
dj
us
te
d
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
te
ar
n
in
gs
).
U
se
s
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
re
co
rd
s
an
d
su
rv
ey
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
to
ca
lc
ul
at
e
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
m
ea
su
re
s
of
re
ti
re
m
en
t
re
so
ur
ce
s
an
d
in
co
m
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
.
R
eg
ar
dl
es
s
of
h
ow
re
ti
re
m
en
t
in
co
m
e
an
d
pr
er
et
ir
em
en
t
in
co
m
e
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
,t
h
e
tw
o-
th
ir
ds
of
h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
w
it
h
pe
n
si
on
s
ap
pr
ox
im
at
e
th
e
65
–7
5
pe
rc
en
tt
h
re
sh
ol
d
of
ad
eq
ua
cy
;h
ou
se
h
ol
ds
w
it
h
ou
tp
en
si
on
s
fa
re
le
ss
w
el
l.
So
ur
ce
:A
ut
h
or
s’
an
al
ys
is
.
N
ot
es
:H
R
S
=
H
ea
lt
h
an
d
R
et
ir
em
en
t
Su
rv
ey
;S
C
F
=
Su
rv
ey
of
C
on
su
m
er
Fi
n
an
ce
s;
SI
PP
=
Su
rv
ey
of
In
co
m
e
an
d
Pr
og
ra
m
Pa
r t
ic
ip
at
io
n
;a
n
d
N
B
S
=
N
ew
B
en
efi
ci
ar
y
Su
rv
ey
.
3 / The Sufficiency of Retirement Savings 41
Social Security wealth (obtained by projecting covered earnings until the
expected age of retirement), pension wealth, financial assets, and housing
assets. These annuitized values as of 1992 are then compared with the 1992
earnings of the household, yielding a replacement rate at each individual’s
expected age of retirement. The authors report nominal replacement rates
when the average respondent was 56 years for the median household
at 97 percent, while the real replacement rate was 66 percent (see also
Montalto 2001).
A similar accounting approach is followed by Wolff (2002) who relies
on repeated cross-sectional Surveys of Consumer Finance (for 1983, 1985,
1989, and 1998). He reaches a gloomy conclusion by calculating ‘expected
retirement income’—a crude estimate of annuitized wealth at the expected
age of retirement—for households in each of the annual surveys. He finds
that average expected retirement income grew from 1989 to 1998, but
the percentage of households’ age 47–64 who would have expected retire-
ment income below the poverty line rose from 17 to 19 percent. He also
concludes that an unequal distribution of financial market gains during
this period implies a rising percentage of people with expected retirement
income below a half of current income, growing from 30 to 43 percent. For
these reasons, Wolfe concludes that there is an increasingly serious shortfall
in retirement income.3
Our own prior related research looks wealth and measures of adequacy
using the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) sample of individuals who first
received Social Security retired-worker benefits in 1980–81 (Haveman et al.
2006). Below we discuss this in more detail; here we simply note that we esti-
mate a comprehensive measure of annuitized wealth in 1982 and ask what
level of potential consumption could be maintained over the remaining
lifetime of the individual (and spouse, if married) if assets were annuitized
and all sources of retirement income were counted. Our results suggest a
modest resource adequacy problem: if the income replacement target is
70 percent of preretirement pay, we find that approximately 30 percent of
new retirees have insufficient resources.
A different set of authors has taken a different modeling tack, develop-
ing a stochastic life-cycle model to compute retirement preparedness. For
instance, Engen et al. (1999) posit that married two-child families maximize
lifetime utility by optimizing consumption and savings both for retirement
(assumed to occur at age 62) and as a precaution against uncertainty.4
Optimal wealth accumulation is defined as that which enables smoothing
of the marginal utility of consumption over the life cycle. The authors then
compare the distribution of simulated results (for couples differentiated
by age–education–pension coverage) with actual wealth/earnings distribu-
tions for working couples (taken from both the HRS and selected Surveys
of Consumer Finance). Assuming a 3 percent rate of time preference, they
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find that over 60 percent of married couples exceed the median target
wealth/earnings ratio (relative to an expected 50 percent in a stochastic
model), suggesting that overall savings are more than ‘optimal’ at the
median of the distribution. But comparisons at other points in the dis-
tribution suggest that about a quarter of couple households are under
saving. Based on these results, the authors calculate replacement rates
(defined as the ratio of Social Security and pension benefits plus income,
but no principal, from wealth to final earnings), and find a median value of
72 percent. The authors argue that, considering lower consumption needs
in retirement, ‘even without saving a large share of income in terms of
financial assets, households can easily achieve replacement rates that are
within the range recommended by financial planners and by the simulation
model.’
This stochastic approach was extended by Scholz et al. (2005) whose life-
cycle model reflects uncertainty regarding life expectancy, the uninsura-
bility of certain future income and expense flows, and the characteristics
of tax, transfer, social, and private pension arrangements. That model
also assumes that each household can solve the optimal consumption/
savings decision problem over the remaining years of its life. This solution,
together with earnings histories, enables a prediction of optimum wealth
holdings for a representative sample of HRS observations. Their model
‘explains’ over 80 percent of the variation in wealth holdings, so the authors
conclude that fewer than 20 percent of households have less actual wealth
than their estimated target level. Even for them, the shortfall from optimal
wealth levels is deemed small.
Yet a third strand of the adequacy literature uses microsimulation models
to project cohort well-being in retirement. For instance, Butrica et al.
(Chapter 4, this volume) simulate using Social Security’s Model of Income
in the Near Term (MINT) how well Baby Boomers will do in retirement.
Their assessment is that Boomer retirees will have higher real income and
lower poverty rates; their replacement rates will be lower.
A fourth strand in the adequacy literature is asking how well-off individ-
uals seem to be as they age, and what influences their ability to weather
shocks in the process. Munnell and Soto (2005a, 2005b , 2005c) have
exploited the longitudinal nature of the HRS surveys to trace the evolution
of replacement rates and compare them to target replacement rates of
65–75 percent of preretirement earnings. They conclude that households
without company pensions fare poorly, whereas those with pensions do
better.
Clearly there are many reasons for the different conclusions across prior
studies, including differences in data, assumptions, estimation procedures,
and the definition of adequacy. For example, Mitchell et al. (2000), Moore
and Mitchell (2000), and Engen et al. (1999) focus on consumption
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smoothing, where potential consumption targets are inferred based on
preretirement pay, or income net of retirement savings. Instead, Wolff
(2002) focuses on wealth accumulation at retirement and its ability to
generate income (and implied consumption) above the poverty threshold.
And even when the main conclusions differ, all prior studies agree that
there is wide heterogeneity in saving adequacy. Indeed, when comparing
differences across studies, Engen et al. (1999) suggest that there may be less
disagreement regarding the overall adequacy of retirement savings than is
generally recognized, after when adjustments are made for differences in
assumptions and estimating procedures.
Methodology: Savings Sufficiency for Two Cohorts
In our prior work we estimated accumulated retirement saving for single
individuals and married couples first observed at retirement in the early
1980s, and we also computed the ANW that this saving implied over their
remaining lifetimes. Retirement was defined as first receipt of Social Secu-
rity benefits. In what follows, we extend this research by comparing our
prior results to those for a new group, one which retired about a decade
later. To do so, we compare estimated ANW to two alternative criteria of
minimum-acceptable consumption adequacy, namely the national poverty
standard, and the ‘near-poverty’ standard, which we set at twice the poverty
standard. We distinguish changes in overall sufficiency over time, and also
intertemporal changes for particular groups of new retirees focusing on
patterns among groups with high and low levels of preretirement earnings
and retirement wealth.
To do so, we draw on two data-sets on individuals entering retirement,
each linked to Social Security administrative records. With these compa-
rably constructed retirement cohorts we are able to examine whether, as
hypothesized by Delorme et al. (2006), later cohorts of retirees are more
vulnerable than were early cohorts to inadequate retirement resources due
to longer life expectancy, changes in the prevalence of defined benefit
(DB) plans, and uncertainties tied to growth in financial assets of defined
contribution (DC) plans and own financial portfolios.
The Early and Later Cohorts
For the early cohort, we use the New Beneficiary Survey (NBS) to assess
the adequacy of economic resources available at the time of retirement as
defined by the first receipt of Social Security retired-worker benefits. The
NBS contains information on a sample of individuals who first received
Social Security benefits in 1980–81 (Ycas 1992); they were interviewed first
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in 1982 and again in 1991. Our sample is drawn from the retired-worker
sample and includes individuals age 62–72 at time of first benefit receipt
and who were interviewed in both years.5
For the later cohort we take respondents to the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) from the 1931–41 birth cohort. This original HRS sample was
aged 51–61 when first interviewed in 1992 and was revisited every two years
after that. In 1998, additional cohorts were added to the HRS interview
sequence, including a cohort born between 1924 and 1930, labeled the
Children of the Depression Age (CODA), which we include in our sample
frame.6 Our HRS sample, therefore, consists of individuals who report
initial Social Security receipt in the two years prior to each interview.7
This setup mimics the NBS data selection on first Social Security receipt
in 1980–81 and the initial interview up to two years later, in 1982. The
HRS respondents must be at least 62 years of age at the first benefit receipt
(the minimum age at which retired-worker benefits can be received) and
no older than age 72 (the maximum age we selected for our NBS analysis
sample).8 By selecting our HRS sample through the 1998 interview, all of
the observations report receiving Social Security benefits by 1998.9
Individuals in both samples are observed as they first enter Social Security
recipiency status, the point in the retirement cycle at which they choose
to first draw on this important retirement asset. The NBS is of individuals
who first receive Social Security during a specific one-year period. The HRS
sample also observes individuals at the point of first Social Security receipt,
but this event can occur over a six-year period, between 1992 and 1998. Our
HRS new beneficiary sample is a younger sample than is the NBS because
it is drawn largely from the original HRS cohort whom we can observe
only over the early retirement-ages rather than from all new Social Security
beneficiaries.10 We adjust for this unequal age distribution (see Figure 3-1)
by standardizing our HRS cohort to the NBS age distribution.11
The NBS and HRS Data-Sets
The NBS and HRS share features important to the study of retirement
adequacy across cohorts. Both the NBS and the HRS gathered detailed
information from individuals on their (and their spouse/partner’s) health,
retirement, and economic status, including demographic information and
data on family structure, work history and current employment, health
status, housing, income and assets, health and life insurance coverage, and
Social Security receipt and benefits. Most important is the matching of both
data-sets to Social Security administrative benefits and earnings records.12
Because both data-sets provide comparably detailed financial infor-
mation for each spouse in married-couple households, we are able to
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Figure 3-1. Age distribution of NBS and HRS samples. (Source: Authors’ calcula-
tions.)
accurately estimate financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth
for all respondents (including the period during which only one spouse
in a married couple survives).13 Asset and housing information is pro-
vided at the household level in both surveys. Our samples are of two
(age-standardized) cohorts that first accepted Social Security benefits (i.e.
retired) approximately a decade apart. Adopting this definition of retire-
ment avoids the need to estimate unobserved preretirement earnings,
savings, and pension and asset accretion of individuals.
Net Wealth
For respondents in both the NBS and the HRS, we calculate for each
unmarried individual and married couple the present value (in $2004)
of all retirement resources currently held and expected over their retired
lifetimes. Net wealth, so defined, is the sum of nonpension financial wealth,
the net value of own home (home value less outstanding mortgage),
other property including business property, the present value of currently
received and expected DB pensions, the value of all DC pension accounts
[including IRA and 401(k)], and the present value of currently received
and expected Social Security benefits.14 In both data-sets, respondents
report directly the value of their financial, property, and net home equity
wealth. For the NBS cohort, we estimate Social Security wealth using the
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monthly inflation-adjusted benefits to which each individual is entitled
(from the linked Master Beneficiary File), calculating the present value (in
1982 but in $2004) of these benefits over the individual’s expected remain-
ing lifetime including, if married, the probable widow(er)hood years of the
longer lived spouse. We include for a married couple spouse and survivor
benefits, if greater than own retired-worker benefits. Survival probabilities
to each year are drawn from 1982 race- and gender-specific life tables
(US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,
National Center for Health Statistics 1985). We discount this expected
stream of Social Security benefits to 1982 using a 2.75 percent rate, taken
to be the individual rate of time preference, yielding the wealth value of
Social Security benefits.15
The value of current (or future expected) employer-provided pension
benefits is provided by the NBS respondent (and, if married, the spouse)
and reflects a nominal value of benefits at the time of interview. While few
pension plans are fully price indexed, we incorporate a price adjustment
estimated from the NBS data. The average annual growth rate of mean
pension benefits from 1982 to 1991 for those fully retired and receiving
benefits in both years was 3.25 percent between 1982 and 1991, a value that
is 0.75 percentage points less than the actual 4 percent rate of inflation
between those years. We thus use a 3.50 percent rate to discount pension
benefit streams to 1982 [2.75 percent for individual time preference plus
0.75 (4.00 − 3.25) to capture the average erosion in the value of pensions
due to inflation]. In calculating couples’ pension wealth, we use survey
responses that indicate whether a pensioner chose a single-life or some
form of survivor benefit that would continue to be paid to a surviving
spouse and adjust our pension wealth estimates for that choice.
For the HRS sample, data on pension wealth are obtained primarily from
the HRS ‘pension estimation program’, which uses plan descriptions pro-
vided by employers, along with specific data from respondents to estimate
pension entitlements held by respondents. Using assumptions on macro-
economic variables consistent with the NBS study (e.g. nominal discount
rate of 3.5 percent), we estimate the present value of each respondent’s or
couple’s stock of pension wealth. We used survey responses to questions
about pension income to construct pension wealth for the CODA cohort,
which was not represented in the ‘pension estimation program’. For the
HRS sample, we use the ‘Mitchell Social Security Wealth’ estimates available
in the restricted version of the data. For those observations for which
this value is not available (28% of our sample), we substitute calculated
Social Security wealth based on the respondent’s own estimate of Social
Security benefits, using the same algorithm as used in the NBS estimate.
For the missing (nonmatched) Social Security wealth estimates, we follow a
procedure similar to those of the NBS and Mitchell, using survey responses
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on current or expected retired-worker benefits amounts for both respon-
dent and the spouse, as well as expected date of receipt if relevant. For
single respondents, the estimate of Social Security wealth is the present
discounted value of the stream of projected benefits taking into account
his or her probability to survive until that age. We again use a 2.75 percent
discount rate (reflecting a nominal rate of 3.5%) and survival probabilities
based on US Decennial Life Tables for 1989–91 (US Department of Health
and Human Services, Public Health Service, National Center for Health
Statistics 1997).
For married couples in both the NBS and the HRS samples, Social
Security plus pension wealth estimates are the expected stream of benefits
of both spouses over their expected lifetimes, including that of the lone
survivor who will claim survivor benefits whenever they exceed their own
work-based benefits.16
Annuitized Net Wealth
Wealth estimates do not account for the number of remaining years of
life, or the two lives of couples, over which resources must be spread.
Our primary measure of well-being is the annuitized value of total assets
over the remaining expected lifetime of respondents and, if married, of
surviving spouses (again using race- and sex-specific life tables). Because
our wealth estimates already reflect differences in inflation indexing, we
use a uniform interest rate of 2.75 percent, taken to be the individual
rate of time preference. The annuitized value we report is the single-
person equivalent annual income that could be consumed if an individual
or couple maintained a steady level of consumption potential over their
remaining lifetimes, including, for couples, the period when only one is
expected to survive. All wealth is annuitized assuming couples require 1.66
of the income of a single individual to maintain equivalent consumption.17
This single-person equivalent permits easy comparison between singles and
couples. It diverges from the income a couple might actually report from
pensions or annuitized wealth (e.g. if an annuity were actually purchased)
because we force a couple to take an annuity that preserves equivalent con-
sumption over the survival of only one of them. This, for example, could
result in lower estimated than actually reported annual pension income for
a couple in which the retired worker selected a single-life pension.18
Characteristics of the Early (NBS) and Later (HRS) Samples
Table 3-2 summarizes key characteristics of the two samples of new Social
Security retired-worker beneficiaries; all dollar values are in $2004. The
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HRS sample is age-standardized by age of first benefit receipt to match the
NBS sample (unadjusted data are available on request). The age reported
in this table and that is used in our analysis is age at first post-benefit-
receipt interview rather than ‘retirement’ age since that is the age at which
financial data are reported.
Differences in the characteristics of the two beneficiary cohorts reflect
changes in both overall population characteristics and the probability
of subgroups achieving eligibility for retired-worker benefits. The later
HRS beneficiary cohort contains a higher proportion of nonwhite respon-
dents, reflecting both the growth in the share of the American popu-
lation that is nonwhite and the increase in Social Security eligibility of
the nonwhite population. Similarly, the greater percentage of new ben-
eficiaries in higher education categories in the HRS cohort reflects the
time-series rise in schooling among the population, as well as the long-
term increase in women’s labor force participation. Because of some-
what different health status definitions in the two data-sets, the means
in respondent and spouse health conditions are not precisely compara-
ble, though the means imply there has been no change in the over-
all probability of poor health among beneficiaries.19 Comparing the
early 1980s to mid-1990s retirees, private health insurance coverage has
fallen somewhat, consistent with overall national patterns of declining
employer-provided health care coverage and its continuation into retire-
ment. While family size has fallen overall, the increasing labor force
participation of women with children is reflected in the higher number
of children among female new beneficiaries. The percentage with cur-
rent or expected pension income, and the percentage, whose longest
job was uncovered by Social Security, are comparable between the two
data-sets.
The bottom panel of Table 3-2 summarizes our ANW estimates (in
$2004) for the early and late cohorts; Figure 3-2 summarizes changes
in distribution of ANW across the two cohorts. For married couples,
mean ANW grew by 60 percent between the cohorts (from $29,200 to
$46,900). For single men and women, the increases were 35 and 37 percent,
respectively.
A striking finding is the rising dispersion in ANW across the cohorts.
Across all households, the standard deviation of ANW rises by more than
140 percent, reflecting the increased inequality in financial wealth hold-
ings over this period. The minimum value of ANW is much lower in the
later sample for all HRS marital/gender groups, perhaps because of the
increased likelihood of low income/wealth spouse-only individuals being
included in the HRS sample. The relatively high variance of ANW in the
HRS sample is likely contributing to the high standard errors in our multi-
variate estimates reported below.
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Estimates of Wealth and ANW
The first panel of Table 3-3 summarizes mean wealth values at retirement
for the early and later beneficiary cohorts ($2004).20 The mean level of
wealth over all individuals and couples in the samples grew by 60 percent,
from the early cohort ($554,000) to the later one ($891,000). Much of
this was due to rising financial wealth; for the NBS cohort, for instance,
average financial wealth was nearly $125,000; a decade later, the mean
level of financial/property wealth for new beneficiaries tripled. During the
period, financial wealth also grew from 22 to 42 percent of total wealth.
The increase in pension wealth between the cohorts is also substantial,
from less than $80,000 to $194,000. Social Security wealth fell by almost
25 percent, from $263,000 in the early cohort, to $207,000 for the later
cohort.21
We also see that, for both the early and later cohorts, the level of wealth
varies substantially by race, marital status, sex, education, and the age of
retirement. For both cohorts, the mean level of wealth for white house-
holds is about twice that for nonwhite households, though the difference is
somewhat larger for the HRS cohort (2.4 times vs. 1.93 times for the NBS
cohort). White households tend to hold a far larger share of their wealth
in financial wealth than do nonwhite households (23% vs. 8.6%), although
the share was larger for both groups in the HRS cohort of retirees (to 44%
and 16.8%, respectively). Mean wealth for retirees in both cohorts is less
Table 3-3 Net Wealth and Annuitized New Wealth of NBS and HRS Sample by Sample
Characteristics
All
Households
Distribution
of Wealth
(%)
Race Marital Status Age at
White Nonwhite Single Married 62–64 65
New Beneficiary Survey
Number of households 7,866 7,059 807 2,083 5,783 2,544 771
Net wealth, means
Total net Wealth $553,967 100.0 $582,786 $301,873 $322,244 $637,431 $522,459 $555,553
Financial/property 124,276 22.4 135,526 25,870 64,603 145,770 94,194 124,897
Housing 86,715 15.7 92,050 40,047 50,127 99,894 81,135 87,135
Pensions 79,447 14.3 83,492 44,065 49,305 90,304 90,444 79,433
Social Security 263,528 47.6 271,718 191,890 158,208 301,464 256,685 264,087
ANW, means
Total ANW $28,060 100.0 $29,279 $17,404 $24,890 $29,202 $24,116 $27,124
Financial/property 6,067 21.6 6,609 1,323 4,933 6,475 4,176 5,981
Housing 4,229 15.1 4,470 2,122 3,723 4,412 3,644 4,039
Pensions 4,191 14.9 4,366 2,662 3,862 4,310 4,349 4,041
Social security 13,573 48.4 13,833 11,296 12,372 14,005 11,947 13,062
Social poverty indicators, means
ANW/poverty
standard
3.52 3.68 2.19 3.13 3.67 3.03 3.41
ANW/twice poverty
standard
1.76 1.84 1.09 1.56 1.83 1.51 1.70
ANW < poverty
standard
0.04 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.04
ANW < 2 × poverty
standard
0.23 0.19 0.54 0.37 0.18 0.31 0.25
Health and Retirement Survey
Number of households 1,952 1,543 409 505 1,447 1,588 180
Net wealth, means
Total net wealth $890,918 100.0 $962,547 $402,290 $459,569 $1,095,624 $875,203 $992,265
Financial/property 376,068 42.2 421,311 67,431 172,856 472,506 342,160 489,329
Housing 113,961 12.8 122,995 52,328 72,016 133,866 108,319 113,988
Pensions 194,019 21.8 204,133 125,025 82,949 246,729 212,237 188,852
Social Security 206,871 23.2 214,107 157,506 131,748 242,522 212,487 200,096
ANW, means
Total ANW $42,971 100.0 $46,044 $22,006 $34,666 $46,912 $39,313 $45,405
Financial/property 17,918 41.7 19,997 3,735 12,976 20,263 15,252 22,260
Housing 5,689 13.2 6,104 2,859 5,446 5,805 4,957 5,249
Pensions 8,929 20.8 9,266 6,625 6,070 10,285 9,361 8,318
Social Security 10,435 24.3 10,676 8,787 10,173 10,559 9,743 9,579
Social poverty indicators, means
ANW/poverty
standard
5.40 5.78 2.76 4.35 5.89 4.94 5.70
ANW/twice poverty
standard
2.70 2.89 1.38 2.18 2.95 2.47 2.85
ANW < poverty
standard
0.08 0.06 0.25 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.09
ANW < 2 × poverty
standard
0.23 0.20 0.52 0.36 0.19 0.27 0.24
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: HRS data are age standardized (see text).
Retirement Marital Status/Sex Education
66–69 70–72 Single Single Married Married No High High Some College+
Women Men Women Men School School College
4,206 345 1,381 702 1,952 3,831 3,406 2,420 1,130 910
$567,267 $620,608 $322,287 $322,160 $623,931 $644,310 $423,752 $582,800 $629,980 $870,273
135,367 209,499 58,569 76,474 125,866 155,912 70,212 130,862 155,064 270,885
88,703 102,682 54,491 41,541 93,042 103,385 64,785 90,697 104,021 136,717
74,065 63,999 48,398 51,091 85,954 92,520 47,240 81,853 94,744 174,598
269,131 244,427 160,829 153,054 319,069 292,493 241,515 279,387 276,150 288,073
$29,861 $37,284 $23,452 $27,719 $27,824 $29,905 $21,584 $28,948 $32,419 $44,527
6,752 11,853 4,168 6,437 5,841 6,799 3,418 6,309 7,810 13,171
4,477 5,943 3,850 3,471 4,270 4,484 3,144 4,386 5,153 6,728
4,137 4,027 3,571 4,436 3,820 4,559 2,518 4,203 5,047 9,361
14,495 15,462 11,863 13,374 13,893 14,063 12,504 14,050 14,409 15,267
3.75 4.68 2.95 3.48 3.49 3.76 2.71 3.64 4.07 5.59
1.88 2.34 1.47 1.74 1.75 1.88 1.36 1.82 2.04 2.80
0.03 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02
0.18 0.14 0.37 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.36 0.14 0.12 0.07
152 32 309 196 671 776 550 704 364 334
$844,261 $808,216 $467,052 $451,113 $963,984 $1,199,169 $473,598 $845,986 $968,496 $1,373,199
333,290 388,109 168,054 178,283 359,714 561,226 149,511 387,215 382,867 618,895
115,933 158,633 77,876 65,394 125,594 140,373 73,939 113,380 112,923 162,658
191,709 50,087 85,328 80,262 220,353 267,476 69,712 137,940 257,043 362,830
203,329 211,387 135,795 127,174 258,323 230,093 180,435 207,452 215,663 228,816
$44,383 $57,396 $32,145 $37,515 $42,915 $50,056 $25,190 $39,491 $47,489 $64,673
17,244 25,842 11,625 14,504 16,194 23,464 8,534 17,867 18,334 28,600
6,182 12,342 5,333 5,574 5,640 5,934 3,898 5,345 5,961 8,036
9,511 3,825 5,711 6,476 9,735 10,718 3,182 6,168 12,020 16,813
11,447 15,387 9,476 10,961 11,346 9,940 9,576 10,111 11,174 11,225
5.57 7.21 4.04 4.71 5.39 6.29 3.16 4.96 5.96 8.12
2.79 3.60 2.02 2.36 2.70 3.14 1.58 2.48 2.98 4.06
0.10 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.02
0.24 0.07 0.39 0.33 0.18 0.19 0.47 0.24 0.15 0.07
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for those who first received benefits at ages 62–64 than those who did so at
later ages.22 In both cohorts, total wealth (unadjusted for household size)
was about twice as great for married compared to single respondents, and
for those with more schooling. Differences for men and women by marital
status are not substantial, though a higher percentage of men’s wealth is in
financial assets.
The second panel of Table 3-3 presents estimates of the single-person
equivalent ANW values for our samples of new beneficiaries. Couples’ mean
ANW rise by almost two-thirds (60 percent) from the early to the later
cohort, while for singles it rose by about 40 percent.23 As was true for
total wealth, ANW is positively related to the age at first benefit receipt.
However, the disparity in ANW values between early (<age 65) and late
retirees is greater than for wealth, as the shorter expected lifetimes of
older retirees reduces the period over which retirement resources must be
annuitized.24 Furthermore, as in the case of the wealth estimates, levels
of ANW vary by socioeconomic group (shown in Appendix Figure 3A-1).
Between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, ANW increased for all of the
age groups, but the relative position of nonwhites, single individuals, early
retirees (62–64-year olds) and those with less education eroded as their
ANW grew more slowly. While ANW for whites in the HRS cohort was
57 percent larger than for whites in the NBS cohort, ANW for nonwhites
increased by only 26 percent from the early to the later cohort. Among
the marital status gender groups, smaller increases in ANW are seen for
single men and women (35% and 37%, respectively), compared to married
men (67%). The pattern seems clear; wealth (and hence, ANW) gains
between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s were greatest for those groups
with the greatest human capital and the strongest attachment to the labor
force. The wealth advantage for whites relative to nonwhites increased sub-
stantially, expanding an already substantial racial disparity in resources at
retirement.
Retirement Resource Adequacy for Newly
Retired Workers
There is no universally accepted definition of retirement resource ade-
quacy, and no consensus on the means of achieving this goal.25 Neverthe-
less, we are able to address the question: ‘Do newly retired workers have
resources sufficient to enable them to escape poverty or near poverty dur-
ing retirement?’ This adequacy criterion reflects a social norm—the meet-
ing of basic needs—irrespective of individual preretirement living stan-
dards. We also study the relative importance of public and private resources
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in supporting retirement and the effects of individual characteristics in
individuals’ ability to meet these adequacy criteria. Specifically, we posit
two absolute standards, namely a family-size-conditioned poverty threshold, and a
threshold equal to twice the poverty threshold; the latter is commonly referred
to as a near-poverty standard.26 A ratio of ANW to the poverty line (or twice
the poverty line) of one or more is interpreted as a level of retirement
resources sufficient to avoid poverty (or near poverty) throughout the
retirement period.
The final panel of Table 3-3 indicates households’ position relative to
the social minimum consumption ratios. For the early and late cohorts,
respectively, the poverty line ratios are 3.5 and nearly 5.5; for the near-
poverty standard the ratios are 1.8 and 2.7, respectively. The increase in
the mean ratio reflects the increase in ANW across the two cohorts. Table
3-3 also shows the percentage of respondents in the various groups who
fail to meet the poverty and near-poverty standards. In contrast to the large
increase in mean ANW, but consistent with the increase in the standard
deviation of the ANW distribution, the percentage of new beneficiaries who
fail to meet the poverty standard rises from the early to the later cohort.
In the early 1980s, about 4 percent of new retirees failed to have ANW
in excess of the poverty threshold; by the mid-1990s, this had increased
to 8 percent; the percentage of failing to meet the near-poverty standard
remained stable at 23 percent.
These patterns persist generally across the more detailed demographic
groups. In general, groups with lower human capital or labor force
attachment (those with low education, women, singles, nonwhites, and
those retired at an earlier age) have substantially lower poverty and
near-poverty ratios than do those with higher levels of human capital
and labor force attachment. For the early and the late cohort, those
groups with low levels of human capital or labor force attachment—
those with low levels of schooling, nonwhites, singles, and females—have
the highest percentages failing to meet the poverty and near-poverty
standards. These same disadvantaged groups experienced the largest
increases in the percentage that fail to meet the poverty and near-poverty
standards.
Correlates of Retirement Resource Adequacy
To describe the predictors of individual resources and resource adequacy,
we next estimate multivariate regression models of ANW and indicators
of falling below the poverty threshold, relating these outcomes to socioe-
conomic characteristics. Table 3-4 presents the ANW results for married
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couples as well as for single men and women. Results for the early (NBS)
cohort are shown in the top panel of the table. Respondents who are
white, with more than a high school degree (and, if married, those with
a more educated spouse), who first received retired-worker benefits at an
older age, and whose longest job was uncovered by Social Security tend
to have higher ANW than respondents without these characteristics. These
characteristics are likely associated with higher savings propensities or more
generous pensions in noncovered work. Respondents with a health con-
dition and those who have a spouse with a health condition have lower
ANW, though respondent health is statistically significant only for married
couples. Two variables that directly capture the presence of components
of ANW—having a private pension and owning a home—are positively
and significantly related to the ANW. Finally, those with private health
insurance coverage have greater ANW than those who lack private health
insurance coverage. The significance of these wealth components indicate
that individuals do not compensate with greater savings in other forms
for the absence of an employer-provided pension or probable absence of
retiree health insurance coverage. Nor is investment in housing merely
an asset allocation decision; housing is either associated with or enables
greater retirement resource accumulation.
The bottom panel of Table 3-4 presents results for the later (HRS)
cohort. With only a few exceptions, patterns are similar, especially for
married couples. In general, the size of the coefficients is larger in the
regressions for the later cohort though levels of statistical significance
are somewhat lower.27 The coefficient of working in an uncovered job
is substantially smaller and statistically insignificant for married couples
in this cohort, most likely due to the difference in the definition of this
variable between the NBS and the HRS coupled with the expansion of
Social Security coverage to federal employment in the 1980s.28 Being wid-
owed or divorced rather than never-married suggests substantially lower
ANW for the later HRS cohort than for the NBS cohort.29 This may
reflect the better labor force prospects of never-married women in the later
cohort (and consequently their ability to accumulate their own retirement
resources), and the financial losses among women among the larger share
of women who become divorced or widowed at an early age in the later
cohort.
Table 3-5 links the failure to meet the poverty standard (ANW/poverty
line ≤ 1) to the same socioeconomic characteristics as above. For the early
(NBS) cohort, several factors are negatively related to the probability of
resource failures, including later retirement age, schooling, coverage by
private health insurance, and the owning of a pension and a home. Vulner-
ability to poverty is higher for nonwhites, having more children, and poor
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health conditions. The pattern of coefficients is similar for the later (HRS)
cohort, though again statistical significance is somewhat less. An exception
to this is the loss of any association between coverage by private health
insurance and having ANW less than the poverty line among single men
and women.
Since our results suggest that the most disadvantaged among the retirees
do not fare well, we conduct some further exploration of the predictors of
the distribution of well-being among retirees at the time of retirement. We
also run quantile regressions for the married sample,30 and these indicate
the influence of a set of explanatory variables on ANW, conditional on the
position in the distribution of the dependent variable. The distinct points
of the ANW distribution that we use are percentiles 20, 40, 50, 60, and 80.31
The age of retirement, which was significantly related to ANW for both
cohorts, has a greater effect at high levels of ANW for the NBS sample than
for the HRS sample (where age has its largest effect over the middle of the
ANW distribution).32 The negative effect of nonwhite on ANW is greater at
the top of the ANW distribution for both the early and the later cohorts,
although the pattern is somewhat different between the samples. The effect
of education on ANW is increasing over the ANW distribution, and is
especially large for those with some college and for college graduates.33
The results for spouse schooling mimic those of the respondent for both
samples. The negative influence of respondent health problems is greater
for those higher in the ANW distribution, and this also is consistent across
samples; the pattern is less clear for spouse health. For both cohorts,
the importance of private health insurance in protecting ANW is greatest
higher in the distribution of ANW. The composition of ANW in terms of
pensions and home ownership appears to be more important for those
higher in the distribution of ANW for the early (NBS) cohort, although the
general pattern holds for the HRS sample as well. Having more children
seems to have a constant effect over the ANW distribution.
Conclusions and Discussion
Our results contribute to the growing literature on the adequacy of
resources of older Americans. In particular, we explore how resources have
changed for two cohorts that entered retirement, defined by Social Security
benefit receipt, nearly two decades apart. The rich data-sets we use permit
comprehensive estimates of the wealth individuals bring into retirement,
avoiding the need to forecast either wealth accumulation or earnings or
the retirement age to which savings may be targeted. With these data-sets
we estimate the ANW of all members of our sample, considering the age
and life expectancy of the respondent (and spouse, if married). We take
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into account the effect of increasing life expectancy on retirement security
of successive cohorts, and we compare wealth to national standards of basic
needs adequacy. The data may not be representative of all current retirees,
they do provide a picture of the resources individuals deem adequate as
they make a key retirement decision.34
We find that only about 4 percent of new retirees in the early cohort have
inadequate resources; for the later cohort, about 8 percent of the respon-
dent living units have ANW below the poverty line. This rise in exposure
to poverty occurs despite wealth increases of more than 50 percent for the
more recent cohort. In both cohorts, more than one-fifth of the sample has
ANW less than twice the poverty threshold. Respondents failing to meet
these standards are concentrated among those groups with lower levels of
human capital, and/or labor force attachment (nonwhites, women, single
individuals, those with low education levels, and those who retired at an
early age). We also show that failure to meet social adequacy targets is
increasingly concentrated among those who fared least well during their
working years, with the least human capital and most modest employment
patterns. In other words, vulnerability during the work life appears to
persist into retirement, and this is particularly true for nonmarried men
and women.
Future work can elaborate our findings in more detail, by following HRS
respondents into retirement to evaluate whether anticipated saving ade-
quacy proved sufficient. In addition, some argue that including the equity
value of owner-occupied housing overstates ANW; alternative estimates can
be derived. Finally, the adequacy standards we use reflect national norms of
minimal acceptable consumption, but these are crude indicators of retire-
ment resources. Future work can do more by accounting for alternative
standards, as well as possible income flows from postretirement employ-
ment, intrafamily transfers, and public cash and in-kind benefits.
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Notes
1 Concern with expost adequacy of individual wealth holdings at the time
of retirement complements that regarding the motivation and pattern of
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consumption-savings choices made prior to retirement. This literature includes
Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Kotlikoff and Summers (1981); more recent
contributions include Banks et al. (1998), Bernheim et al. (2001), Hurd and
Rohwedder (2003), and Venti and Wise (2000); see also Bloom et al. (2002).
2 The Congressional Budget Office (2003) provides an extensive review of these
studies and a summary of their results.
3 For several reasons, Wolff’s conclusion seems overstated. First, he assumes people
aged 47–64 will accrue no additional savings between their current age and the age
of their retirement. Second, he assumes that the financial and housing assets that
they currently hold will not grow in real value over the years from their current age
to the age of retirement. Third, his replacement rate uses ‘current’ earnings as the
denominator.
4 To incorporate uncertainty of earnings in preretirement years, heterogeneous
earnings shocks over the preretirement years are introduced. When this stochastic
pattern is recognized, some households who have optimal savings will have wealth-
earnings ratios below (above) the median and hence be seen as having inadequate
(adequate) savings.
5 Our NBS sample consists of respondents who were interviewed in both years; we
do not require that their spouses survive. We require a 1991 interview since data on
earnings and on Social Security and pension benefits are available for many spouses
of retired workers only in the later survey. We exclude from our sample individuals
who have fewer than ten years of recorded Social Security earnings data after the
age of 50. For details on those who attrited see Antonovics et al. (2000).
6 With the CODA sample added to our sample, the older HRS spouses in the
original HRS cohort, approximately age 68–74 when first interview in 1998, now
become part of the individual sample.
7 For a married couple, the first person to be identified determines the timing of
‘retirement’ for the couple.
8 Both data-sets have age of benefit receipt. The first interview occurs up to two
years after initial benefit receipt in both data-sets. Financial variables are identified
as at that age. The NBS sample was truncated at age 72 since at the time of the NBS
that was the age at which the earnings test was lifted. We use that same age limit in
selecting the HRS sample.
9 The 1998 cutoff is because the primary purpose of the project from which this
paper derives is to track well-being over the years after this retirement point. We
have done this in the NBS for the 1982–91 periods (Haveman et al. 2005). Our
HRS sample is intended as one that can be followed for a minimum of six years, up
to the latest 2004 interview.
10 This is the case even though we include members of the CODA sample in our
analysis. For the CODA sample, we only include those who retired in the two years
prior to 1998, the period of observation that is both available and consistent with
our selection for the HRS more generally.
11 Descriptive data are weighted by the HRS weights and by the age-standardizing
‘weight’. The standardization adjusts for the differential ‘population sampling’ of
new beneficiaries from the younger HRS sample. In other words, we must observe a
lower proportion of retirements at later ages among the HRS cohort because of the
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younger age of the original HRS sample. Differential patterns of retirement timing
by racial groups or by gender are reflected in the data, but these represent ‘true’
changes over time in population composition and retirement timing rather than
sample selection procedures.
12 The NBS is fully matched to Social Security Earnings History and Master Ben-
eficiary records. The HRS is also linked to Social Security Administration (SSA)
administrative data, but only for respondents who granted permission for the link;
we estimate Social Security wealth from reported Social Security benefit amounts
for individuals who refused permission.
13 We use the RAND HRS data file (Version F). See http://hrsonline.isr.umich.
edu/ for more information on this file.
14 Because the NBS does not include an estimate of nonhousing debt, we subtracted
the value of nonhousing debt from the HRS financial wealth estimate for consis-
tency. The resulting overstatement of net wealth is modest as older households hold
very small amount of nonhousing debt. Gist and Figueiredo (2002) report median
1989 nonhousing debt (in $1998) for those in the lowest quarter of the income
distribution of $850, rising to about $2,900 for those in the middle two quartiles
and to about $12,000 for those in the top quartile.
15 We selected this rate for comparability with Smith (1995). The rate used in
other studies, including those discussed above, typically ranges between 2.5 and
3.0 percent.
16 Social Security and pension wealth for married couples is the sum of spousal
wealth values. The value of Social Security benefits are estimated conditional on
remaining married or being a sole survivor, using Social Security survivorship rules.
If a pensioner indicated continuation of benefits to his or her surviving spouse, a
joint and two-thirds (67%) survivor benefit is assumed.
17 This equivalence scale, based on the National Academy of Sciences study of
poverty measurement (Citro and Michael 1995), is used to allocate wealth—and
achieve equivalent consumption—over the married and widow(er)ed lifetimes of
couples.
18 It is interesting that our annuitized values are remarkably close to the inflation-
indexed annuity estimated by the Social Security Office of the Actuary (NASI 2005).
The Office estimated a single unisex life annuity of approximately $741 paid to a
65-year old for a $10,000 payment. Our estimates imply on average (across our race
and sex groups) a $737 annual annuity for the same payment.
19 In the HRS, we use a self-reported health (SRH) status variable, and assign a
value of 1 to those reporting fair/poor health status. For NBS, those with the four
or more limitations on daily living are assigned a value of 1. Note that both samples
exclude disabled workers who had received benefits prior to age 62: the NBS does
so explicitly and our HRS sample by our selection criteria.
20 Our estimates of asset values for the NBS and HRS samples tend to be greater
than those based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation, but smaller
than estimates of asset holdings for households headed by persons aged 62–
70 years in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This latter difference is
likely to be due to the higher proportion of older persons in this age range
in the SCF, as well as the substantial efforts of the SCF in collecting wealth
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data, especially among high-wealth individuals (available from the authors on
request).
21 This is not due to increased early retirement since all descriptive statistics are age
standardized. This may still reflect differences in the probability of Social Security
eligibility by gender, marital status, and other characteristics.
22 Given the age of the initial HRS and the shorter period we observe the CODA
sample we have a smaller number who retired at 66+ and so we can say less about
the relative economic position of older retirees.
23 This difference is much smaller than the marital status difference in total wealth,
a result of both allocating wealth over the remaining lifetime of the longer surviving
spouse and accounting for the greater consumption needs of married couples when
both spouses are alive.
24 Because our samples include only new beneficiaries, this age effect is not a
measure of the effect of delaying retirement on the economic well-being of early
retirees. It only indicates that those who delay retirement have both higher wealth
and greater ANW.
25 The 1965 Older Americans Act stipulates the following objective: ‘An adequate
income in retirement in accordance with the American standard of living’.
26 We use the revised poverty lines suggested by the National Research Council
study of poverty (Citro and Michael 1995). In 2000, the absolute poverty line for
single individuals was $7961 in $2004; for married couples we used the single-person
equivalent ANW.
27 Our bootstrap estimates indicate that this is not wholly a consequence of the
smaller HRS sample to test whether the difference between HRS and NBS coef-
ficients and standard errors were attributable to differences in sample size, we
simulated NBS bootstrap estimates of standard errors for an NBS sample of a
size comparable to the HRS. Using this smaller NBS sample yields standard errors
approximately double those in the original NBS regressions, but only about one-
half of the standard errors in the HRS regressions. The higher variance of the
dependent variable (ANW) in the HRS relative to the NBS could account for the
remainder of the difference.
28 The NBS asks directly about longest job coverage. The HRS asks if the respondent
ever worked in an uncovered job.
29 Note indicates the effect of marital status among single individuals at the time
they retire and does not describe the effect of becoming widowed or divorced
compared to being married.
30 See Buchinsky (1998).
31 Full results are available on request from the authors.
32 This difference in samples may be tied to the slightly different sample structure
of the two data-sets.
33 For the earlier HRS cohort, this pattern is pronounced for college graduates
only.
34 Virtually all US citizens become new Social Security beneficiaries at some age.
For some, that age may reflect retirement-age adjustments in response to the
adequacy of savings; for others unexpected events may lead to unexpectedly early
retirement.
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Appendix
A: ANW−−by age
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Figure 3-A1. Levels of ANW by socioeconomic group. (Source: Authors’
calculations.)
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C: ANW−−by education
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Figure 3-A1. (continued)
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